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R E S E A R C H  &  A N A LY S I S
Creating Infrastructures  
for Peace – Experiences  
at Three Continents
Paul van Tongeren
"Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable 
national infrastructure for peace that allows societies 
and their governments to resolve conflicts internally 
and with their own skills, institutions and resources.” 
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan1 
Introduction
Most countries lack the capacities and structures to deal adequately with 
on-going and potential violent conflict. 'Infrastructures for Peace' (I4P) 
refers to building standing capabilities or infrastructures for peacebuilding 
and prevention within countries, communities and regions, involving the 
main stakeholders. Often much focus and resources are given to external 
organisations and experts in Northern countries, intervening in other 
countries. With I4P the focus is on building capacities and structures 
within countries, regions and communities.
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 These peace structures have a real impact: several times in the past two 
decades they have proven to be effective tools for preventing or reducing 
violence (South Africa, prior to the elections in 1994; during recent elec-
tions in Ghana and Kenya). There is an increasing interest in I4P, which 
is important because experts expect an increase in violent conflicts.2 
The concept of Infrastructures for Peace
The well-known scholar and practitioner John Paul Lederach introduced 
this concept in his book Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in 
Divided Societies (1997): "I have a rather modest thesis. I believe that 
the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the 
need for a set of concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional 
statist diplomacy. Building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term 
commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of society, 
an infrastructure that empowers the resources of reconciliation from 
within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside."3
Lederach’s model included the need for structural transformation. 
Infrastructure, in his view, is not a rigid structure but a process: a 
functional network that spans across divisions and levels of society and 
ensures optimum collaboration between the main stakeholders. "As 
such, a platform is responsive to day-to-day issues that arise in the ebb 
and flow of conflict while it sustains a clear vision of the longer-term 
change needed in the destructive relational patterns. The creation of such 
a platform, I would submit, is one of the fundamental building blocks 
for supporting constructive social change over time."
Belgian scientist Luc Reychler used the concept of 'architecture' or 
'infrastructure' for peace to describe a fairly wide variety of coordinated 
and focussed peacebuilding strategies at all levels of society. His aim 
is to create a more effective system to prevent violence.4 
Both terms, infrastructure and architecture, are metaphors. The 
attraction of the ‘architecture’ metaphor, as explained by Reychler, is 
that an architectural project requires imagination, planning, involving 
all stakeholders, building blocks for different types of conflicts and 
effective implementation. 
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'Infrastructure' conveys the image of extensive networks, that connect 
sections of a society in various ways and enables productive interaction. 
Both descriptions embody the ideas of involving main stakeholders 
in peacebuilding as a joint responsibility of society as a whole and 
using all available resources, capacities, mechanisms and structures 
for sustainable peace.
A broad definition of Infrastructures for Peace was drafted at a meeting 
in Kenya, February 2010. Representatives of governments, political 
parties, civil society and UN Country Teams from 14 African coun-
tries came together in Naivasha and agreed on a definition of I4P as a 
"dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, 
values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute 
to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society."5 
Another description is more specific: establishing a national infras-
tructure for peace could include:
-  adopting a cooperative, problem-solving approach to conflict, 
based on dialogue and non-violence, which includes all main 
stakeholders;
-  developing institutional mechanisms, appropriate to each country's 
culture, which promote and manage this approach at local, district 
and national levels.6
An even shorter description is: institutional capabilities for peacebuil-
ding, prevention and post-war recovery. 
In his article Building National Infrastructures for Peace Chetan Kumar 
described many different forms of activities, such as organising a 
national dialogue; establishing a network of local mediators easing 
tensions among communities; providing quiet support for national 
efforts to reach a political agreement on the new draft constitution; 
assisting with implementing an early warning and response system by 
governments and CSOs; supporting advocacy campaigns for peace and 
establishing or strengthening Peace Committees at all levels.7 
Establishing a Peace Infrastructure can be a complex process and it 
may take a long time before it is an inclusive, well-functioning peace 
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infrastructure. It took Kenya 20 years and Ghana 8 years to establish a 
Peace infrastructure, and in both countries it is still work in progress. 
This work has been advanced and expanded in many countries by 
the invaluable work of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery (BCPR).
In some countries governments have established a Ministry of Peace8; 
in other countries Local Peace Committees have been set up by civil 
society, without government involvement in the beginning. The Wajir 
Peace and Development Committee in Kenya is a well-known example 
in this respect (see chapter 6). The process towards an I4P in the case 
of Kenya started informally, at district level, but gained momentum 
and became a national policy. This process took twenty years. A similar 
process took place in Ghana, involving some eight years. Despite these 
successful examples, there is a real danger that a Ministry or even a 
newly created Ministry of Peace in the end will be not use the great 
potential of other stakeholders, but will try to implement peacebuilding 
from above.
There is an enormous diversity of activities, tools, mechanisms and 
structures related to Infrastructures for Peace, as well as the number 
of options on how to involve governments.9 
Nicaragua and Ghana
Nicaragua
In Building Peace, Lederach describes peace commissions and 
elaborates on Nicaragua in the late 1980s.10  Throughout the 1980s, 
multiple internal wars raged in Central America. This tragic period 
was formally ended with the Central American peace accord, 
signed in Guatemala by five countries (1987). The Nicaraguan 
government moved quickly to set up a national peace commission, 
region-specific commissions and a network of local commissions.
In fact, two independent systems of peace commissions were 
established. In the south of Nicaragua, religious leaders joined 
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forces at the peak of the war to negotiate conflict-free zones, 
forming small commissions of local residents to foster dialogue 
between the Sandinista government and contra rebels at the 
community level. Their original mission was to document and 
investigate human rights violations. Over time, it came to 
include all sorts of intra-community disputes, land conflicts and 
crime. By 1990, sixty commissions had arisen. The model for 
this conciliation effort was that of an insider-partial mediation 
effort, involving intermediaries from within the conflict who as 
individuals enjoyed the trust and confidence of one side, but who 
as team provided balance in their mediation work. 
The second type of peace commission, as a component of the 
regional peace settlement, was the International support and 
Verification Commission (CIAV) of the Organisation of American 
States, which started work in 1990. It was originally charged with 
overseeing the demobilisation of over 22,000 contra combatants 
in the northern and western regions of the country. By 1995, the 
CIAV supported the creation of 96 peace commissions working on 
mediation, verification of human rights protections, promotion of 
human rights and facilitation of community projects. The peace 
commissions permitted an unprecedented space for dialogue in 
which citizens could safely express their views.
Ghana
Ghana has had a stable and democratic government since 1992, 
but is burdened with a troubled past of military coups and 
dictatorial rule. At the surface, present Ghana is peaceful.11 A 
study commissioned by the Ministry of Interior however identified 
several conflict factors, including chieftancy, civil and labour 
unrest, inter/intra-political party conflicts, land-, religion-, ethnic/
identity conflicts, minerals and economic resources. One of those 
conflicts, the Konkomba-Nanumba war in 1994-1995, left 5,000 
people dead. Another serious conflict erupted in 2002 in the 
northern region. The government of Ghana feared that these 
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events might derail upcoming elections. The regional government 
established the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council in 2004 
as a mediation and conflict resolution mechanism.In 2006 the 
government decided to establish a National Architecture for 
Peace, with a National Peace Council, Regional Peace Councils 
and District Peace Councils. In March 2011 the National Peace 
Council Bill was unanimously adopted by Parliament.12
Rationale of I4P
The world is not becoming a safer and more secure place. The opposite 
seems to happen.
Violent conflict has emerged as a central obstacle to the attainment of 
equitable and sustainable development. According to the World Bank, 
some 1.5 billion people live in fragile and conflict affected contexts in 
some 90 countries. Many of these are caught in what could be referred 
to as a ‘violence trap’.13 
New, dynamic developments, like the Arab Spring, increase instability. 
There is also a growing trend that elections become more contested 
and violent, as happened in DRC, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Kenya. 
Elections become triggers for dormant, unsolved conflicts. Because the 
root causes of injustice, lack of security and deep grievances are not 
addressed, those feelings and resentments flare up during elections. A 
region like West Africa counted several civil wars in the nineties and 
the beginning of this century. For some time there was a development 
towards more stability, but that has now stopped or is been reversed: 
countries like Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria have begun to show a pattern 
of more violent conflicts in recent years.
Many countries have a huge potential for violent conflict, but lack 
adequate analysis, mechanisms and structures to deal with this. The 
usual government response is to reinforce law and order. In many 
(parts of) countries, however, government is not providing security 
and justice for its citizens, or groups of them. Many governments are 
fragile or highly polarized. Interethnic tensions are rising, societies are 
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becoming more divided on core issues and politics becomes involved 
with gangs and criminality. 
Experts expect an increase in conflicts on competition for scarce 
resources, added to existing grievances between groups. "As a result 
of the economic downturn, climate change and the growing depletion of 
resources, from arable land to water to oil, disputes within and between 
States may become more common in the future."14
Outside intervention to address a violent conflict in a country has 
become more complicated and obsolete. Instead of intervening 
in countries we’d better assist them to build their own capacities 
in preventing and solving conflicts. As former SGUN Kofi Annan 
described it in his 2006 Review report on Conflict Prevention: 
"Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable national 
infrastructure for peace."15  During the recent two decades it has been 
shown that this approach is fruitful. South Africa successfully pioneered 
a peace structure during the years preceding elections in 1994, building 
mechanisms at local, and regional levels that effectively stopped the 
escalation of violence. In Ghana and Kenya the existence of Peace 
Committees has reduced or prevented violence during elections. 
Additionally, investing in Peace Infrastructures is highly cost-effective.
Components of I4P
The concept of Infrastructures for Peace is relatively new. There is no 
agreed definition of I4P; descriptions are sometimes very broad. That 
means that it is not easy to identify its different components but the 
policy documents of two pioneering countries, Ghana and Kenya, 
are helpful. Both have developed an I4P in a very solid and inclusive 
process over a period of between ten and twenty years. In 2011, 
Ghana institutionalised its Peace Architecture in the National Peace 
Council Act. In 2001, Kenya established a Steering Committee on 
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and after many consultations 
produced a Final version of National Policy on Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Management (December 2011).16   From these two policy 
documents we can learn more about the main components, the pillars 
under the Infrastructures for Peace.
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Peace Committees. It is very important to have a peace structure at 
all levels, national, district and local. These committees consist in 
general of highly respected persons who are capable of bridging poli-
tical divides and possess competence, knowledge and experience in 
matters of conflict transformation and peace (in some cases, it might 
be appropriate to have representatives from opposing parties within 
the peace committees). The work of the Peace Committees has to be 
guided by bipartisanship and independence. Their main objectives are 
violence reduction, promoting dialogue, problem solving, community 
building and reconciliation.
A National Peacebuilding Platform or Forum will be a platform of the 
main stakeholders in peacebuilding, for consultation and cooperation.
Conflict Analysis and Early Warning & Response System. Crucial is a 
thorough conflict analysis and follow-up program how to deal with the 
different conflicts and set up an Early Warning & Response system.
A Peace Building Support Unit will be established at the government, 
often the Ministry of Interior. This Unit will develop the overall 
government policy on peacebuilding together with the National Peace 
Committee and Platform and implement it.
A Bill on Infrastructures for Peace will be the result of an intensive 
process of consulting the main stakeholders, at all levels.
Building national capacities for peace. The aim is to increase the 
capacity of peacebuilding institutions of government, departments, peace 
committees and others, including CSO groups. Broad based skills training 
will be offered to functionaries, public servants or members of civil society 
in peacebuilding, including conflict analysis, conflict early warning and 
response, conflict resolution and supporting dialogue processes.
Involvement of insider mediators. The development and application of 
national and local capacities requires sustained accompaniment, where 
specialists assist their counterparts in overcoming initial suspicion 
and hostility by developing relations of trust and then impart skills for 
negotiation and mediation. Strengthening the role of insider mediators 
is very important; Peace and Development advisors from UNDP can 
play those roles as well.
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Traditional perspectives on conflict resolution. Traditional pers-
pectives, understanding and solutions to conflict will be offered and 
strengthened.
Promotion of a shared vision of society and a culture of peace. Com-
mon values and a shared vision of society will be promoted and policies 
and structures established to implement them. Values of reconciliation, 
tolerance, trust and confidence building, mediation and dialogue as 
responses to conflict will be highlighted. 
Peace Education and the celebration of the International Day of Peace, 
September 21st, will be part of such an overall policy.
Budget. Peacebuilding and conflict management intervention strate-
gies require long-term funding by governments, donors, NGOs and 
communities.
Establishing, implementing and monitoring an Infrastructure for 
Peace. In the initial phase of establishing an infrastructure, main 
stakeholders will be consulted: government and non-state actors and 
different sectors of society at the national, district and local level. 
Analysing the root causes of conflict in a country shall be a participatory 
and inclusive effort. When such a policy has been approved, it has to 
be operationalized and regular assessments have to be executed.
These components are not a straitjacket, but possible pillars of a 
national infrastructure for peace. It is essential that each process, 
structure and mechanism is authentic and designed by the stakeholders 
themselves or in close collaboration with the main stakeholders.
Kenya, Colombia and the Philippines
 Kenya 
 National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 
Final version, December 2011. 17 
 Chapter Five: Pillars of the policy. 
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 The policy has six key pillars that are critical to the achieve-
ment of the overall goal. It underscores the need for conflict 
sensitive planning and programming at all levels of regional, 
sub-regional, national and community development. These 
pillars are:
 - Institutional Framework
 - Capacity Building
 - Conflict Prevention
 - Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy
 - Traditional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation
 - Post-Conflict Recovery and Stabilisation.
 Chapter Six: Institutional framework
 - The Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and 
Internal Security, envisaged as the Parent Ministry, shall in 
collaboration with other Stakeholders, develop a framework for 
the implementation of this policy. The envisaged framework 
will provide for the establishment of a collaborative mechanism 
to operationalize this policy pending the establishment of the 
NPC. In addition, the framework will provide for capacity 
building and financing mechanisms.
 - The National Peace Council 
 - The Council Secretariat
 - County Peace Secretariat
 - Local Peace Committees
 - Stakeholders' Peace Fora
 - The Legal framework
 - Funding for the Peace Infrastructure
 - Monitoring and Evaluation
 - Policy review
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 Colombia
 Colombia has a history of four decades of internal armed 
conflict.18  Especially the last fifteen years experience has 
grown with some components of Infrastructures for Peace: 
Local Peace Committees, large Peace constituencies, a Na-
tional Peace Council and a High Commissioner for Peaceand 
Reintegration.
 LPCs, Peace Communities, Peace Laboratories, Zones of 
Peace are (or have been) flourishing in some of the most 
vulnerable conflict zones. The main objective of most LPCs 
is that local communities declare themselves a zone of peace 
to obtain protection from the surrounding violence. Many 
organised themselves into associations of peace communities 
to obtain more bargaining power with the armed actors. 
 Most LPCs established institutions to ensure maximum par-
ticipation in decision making, a 'Constituent Assembly', open 
general assemblies or Municipal Forums for all members of 
the community. Working committees met every month, on 
specific issues, with representatives of unions, the church, 
youth & women organisations, etc. Such forums started to 
conduct diagnostic assessments to determine the causes of 
violence and poverty in each community, and to draw up a 
development and peace plan for the community. At national 
level, 4,000Colombians gathered in 1998, one week before 
the inauguration of president-elect Pastrana (who had pro-
mised to negotiate peace with guerrilla groups) and held a 
Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace.
 In 1998, peace negotiations started between rebel forces 
and the government. A National Peace Council was set 
up including government and CSO representatives. The 
government never involved CSOs in the peace negotiations 
and the NPC did not make significant progress towards peace.
 President Pastrana’s successor Uribe recognised the paramili-
tary unit United Self-Defence Forces, AUC as a political entity 
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and negotiated with them a demobilisation process. To oversee 
this process and develop reintegration programmes, a High 
Commissioner for Peace and Reintegration was established by 
the President's office and regional offices were created as well. 
Up to 2008 almost 47,000 persons handed in their weapons.
 Lessons learned
 Virginia Bouvier concluded in Colombia: Building Peace in 
a Time of War that greater participation of civil society in 
various aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding ensures 
greater buy-in at the local level and leads to a more durable 
peace. Peace initiatives such as the peace and development 
programs focus directly on development and human needs 
as prerequisites for peace. This combination of peace and 
development goals seems to hold promise. Some suggest 
that underutilised institutional structures such as the Na-
tional Peace Council could be an effective mechanism for 
channelling civil society participation.
 The Philippines
 In 1986, the People Power Revolution in the Philippines led 
to the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. The new government 
initiated peace talks with existing rebel forces in the coun-
try. The Office of the Peace Commissioner was established 
under the Office of the President. Under president Ramos, 
the post of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) 
with Cabinet rank was created and charged with the mana-
gement of the comprehensive peace process and assisted by 
a fulltime secretariat (OPAPP). The government established 
Government Peace Negotiating panels for negotiations with 
the different rebel groups.OPAPP is only a national body; 
there is no regional peace structure.19 
An Independent Peace Structure
As described earlier, Infrastructures for Peace is a broad concept with 
many modalities, ranging from I4P with a national mandate to informal 
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Local Peace Committees, independent from the government. In Kenya 
and Ghana bottom-up processes developed in remote, poor regions; 
pioneering Regional Peace Committees were created and succeeded 
in attracting the interest of their governments. Examples of I4P with 
government leadership can be found in Costa Rica, Peru and Nepal. 
Costa Rica, Peru and Nepal
Costa Rica
In 1997, a law for the Alternative Resolution of Conflicts and 
Promotion of Peace was passed. This law requires peace edu-
cation in every school. In September 2009, the Costa Rican 
legislature passed a law changing the name of the country's 
Justice ministry to the Ministry of Justice and Peace. The new 
Ministry is working with non-profit organizations to imple-
ment a national plan for peace promotion, which includes 
installing mediation programs in schools all over the country 
and organising Peace Festivals. Communities are invited to a 
public place, where peace messages are delivered and a social 
network is set up to help prevent crime and promote social 
peace. There is a National Council for Security and Social 
Peace, in which high government authorities work towards 
promoting security and peace as a national policy.
Peru
Peru is still in the midst of a reconciliation process after 
the bloody civil war that took place among rural indigenous 
communities during the 1980s. It also faces a resurgence of 
the armed guerrilla and increased violence due to conflicts 
resulting from the exploitation and distribution of natural 
resources. In 1993, the Ombudsperson Office was establis-
hed as an autonomous public institution that would defend 
human rights and promote mediation and conciliation initia-
tives. In 2008 the government launched a program, in order 
to lay the groundwork for a Decentralized National System 
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for Prevention and Constructive Conflict Management 
and Transformation. It was led by the Council of Ministers 
(PREVCON), funded by international cooperation; the 
funds were administered by the UNDP. The central goal 
was to institutionalise dialogue and peaceful mechanisms 
for channelling social demands timely and through demo-
cratic institutions. The program developed a decentralised 
approach for building capacities at regional and local level, 
involving public sector officers and civil society leaders. In 
October 2012, its profile  and name were once more chan-
ged: it is now called the National Office of Dialogue and 
Sustainability (ONDS).
As conflicts in the country increased, each successive prime 
minister emphasised different approaches within the Con-
flict Management Unit with either more focus on dialogue 
and trust building or more on the use of force and detention 
of opposition leaders. Government and CSOs had widely 
varying relationships, ranging from ‘partners’ to ‘opponent’. 
Most observers feel the program helped in the creation of 
broader capacity building throughout the country, although 
inconsistencies in government approaches reduced its im-
pact.20
Nepal
The root causes of the conflict in Nepal included feudalism, 
exclusion of minorities, weak governance and government 
neglect. The conflict was partly a rural revolt against 
perceived discrimination and neglect. In 2005 it was 
decided to establish Local Peace Councils (LPCs), but the 
implementation was difficult and became contested. The 
then ruling party, the Nepali Congress, lacked the political 
will to establish the envisaged High Level Peace Commission 
as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006.
The government decided to create a Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction in 2007. Some questioned the independence 
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of the LPCs when they became closely linked with and reliant 
upon this Ministry, which was run by the Maoist Party at 
the time. There was reluctance to establish joint multiparty 
control over the peace architecture. LPCs were established 
by order from the central government, without the needed 
local consultations. Some LPCs did function but most failed, 
due to their lack of local weight and legitimacy.21
When Peace structures are designed, one option is to establish them 
within the government as was done in the examples above. Advantages 
maybe the weight of a government ministry, department or Peace 
Secretariat, or indeed good coordination with other ministries, 
especially on issues of security and justice.
Disadvantages maybe government dominance, with other stakeholders 
like civil society taking second place. Also, a more bureaucratic 
approach is a real danger. If there is a lot of polarization between or 
within government and political parties, the Ministry of Peace maybe 
partisan and less able to fulfil a bridge-building function. The amount 
of expertise and capacity recruited from outside (e.g. the community 
of peacebuilders) may be outweighed by that recruited from within 
the government. Experience has learned also that governments tend 
to steer the process in a top-down manner. Also, when a government 
is weak or corrupt, thepeace structure it dominates is doomed to fail.
The Nepal case clearly demonstrates the risks when political parties or 
the government wants to steer the Peace Infrastructure without (much) 
consultation. This may kill the legitimacy of the Peace structure and 
paralyse it.
The other option is a (semi-) independent Peace Infrastructure, as was 
the case in Ghana and Kenya. Article 30 of the National Peace Council 
Actor Ghana (2011) states clearly: "Independence of the Council: Except 
as provided in the Constitution, the Council shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any person or authority in the performance of its 
functions."
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Such a policy will be informed by one of the guiding principles of 
I4P, which is that the main stakeholders must be involved. The go-
vernment will always play a crucial role in deciding on the mandate 
it will give to the Peace Infrastructure, in drafting a Policy Paper or 
a Bill, in deciding on the composition of the Peace Council, etc. By 
organising consultations with civil society, by asking for nominations 
for Peace Committee-members and/or by giving respected civil society 
leaders a prominent role in a National Peace Committee, governments 
can aim for equal positions of different stakeholders. In Ghana, the 
National Peace Council consists of thirteen Eminent Persons: eight 
representatives of religious bodies, other persons nominated by the 
president, identifiable groups and one representative of the National 
House of Chiefs.
With an independent peace infrastructure, expertise in peacebuilding, 
mediation and other capacities can be used more fully. With a 
government institution, there is a greater possibility for political 
appointments; civil servants may come from within the government 
bureaucracy rather than from outside, selected on their peacebuilding 
capacities. In many countries, politics and government have less 
legitimacy as compared to respected civil society leaders. Where the 
need for peace infrastructures and the potential for violent conflict is 
greater, the ineffectiveness of governments may sometimes be great as 
well – by its weakness, corruption or not delivering security and justice.
An independent Peace structure maybe more flexible and less expensive. 
The NPC in Ghana has its own Secretariat, while the Ministry of the 
Interior –which is in charge of peacebuilding and security – has a small 
Peacebuilding Support Unit.
The challenge is to find the right balance between independence and 
a government-steered body. Peacebuilding is an inclusive effort and 
involves the main stakeholders as equal partners. Too much independence 
and the government feels too distant with the added risk of having no 
weight or legitimacy; too little independence and the role of the various 
stakeholders apart from the government risks being diminished. 
Why would a government give a mandate to a semi-independent Peace 
Infrastructure? It could be because not addressing the underlying roots 
for violent conflict may cause dormant tensions to flare up and escalate, 
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for instance during elections. This can ruin the whole social fabric and 
also undermine the positions of the ruling elite. Working with main 
stakeholders, for the sake of sustainable peace, may facilitate a climate 
of stability and may give the ruling government more legitimacy, 
increase donor funding and foreign investments.22 
The type of Peace Infrastructure established in Ghana and Kenya 
is focussed on soft power, on bridge building, confidence building, 
mediation. Dealing with security and other power issues is still in 
the hands of the government. Governments that do not consider the 
wisdomof organising an inclusive and participatory peace structure, 
may do so at their peril.23 After all, recent years have not been free 
from electoral violence.
Informal Local Peace Committees
In the international debate most attention is focussed on I4P with a 
national mandate. This makes sense, because such an I4P will have 
more impact and legitimacy. However, quite a lot of countries have 
weak/ fragile/collapsing governments or authoritarian regimes, which 
are not interested in such peace structures. What can people do when 
their national government will not support them in their pursuit of 
peacebuilding? The answer, in many countries, has been to create 
informal Local Peace Committees (LPCs).24
LPCs is a generic name for committees or other structures formed 
at the level of a district, municipality, town or village with the aim to 
encourage and facilitate joint, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuil-
ding. They often fulfil a useful function in opening a dialogue in a 
divided community, solving community conflicts and protecting their 
communities from violence.
What is known about the LPCs’ impact? Can they have a role without 
support of the national government? What hampers them most? And 
could a bottom-up strategy work in which such LPCs gradually start 
receiving more support from the regional government and finally get a 
mandate and support from the national government? Let’s learn from 
some recent experiences. 
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1. South Sudan: the Collaborative in South Kordofan25 
The Collaborative is a network of local peace activists from Sudan and 
South Sudan, who have continued to coordinate efforts across the new 
border. Formed in 2008, the Collaborative has built up twelve peace 
committees in South Kordofan (Sudan, where the Nuba Mountains 
are) and Unity State (South Sudan). The Peace Committees are 
trained to analyse conflict and find locally-led solutions, supported 
by a Rapid Response Fund (RRF) controlled by the Collaborative 
where necessary. In most cases the RRF is not needed and costs are 
covered by community contributions. The Collaborative is partner of 
the UK-based NGO Peace Direct. For three years, the Collaborative 
has been working with communities to identify and train local peace 
activists and coordinate them into a more effective network. As the 
Peace Committees are entirely voluntary, there isself-selection process, 
which identifies those people most committed to peacebuilding.
The Peace Committees aim to respond quickly to conflicts, prevent 
smaller conflicts from escalating and to help communities resist any 
pressure to become involved in the conflict. In most cases the Peace 
Committees –with over 70 members– have been supported by the 
local administration, traditional leaders and even the security forces.
The Peace Committees respond appropriately to the conflicts and 
according to a recent evaluation:
- in 57 per cent of Peace Committee interventions, communities 
that previously fought alongside one of the parties, now have 
chosen not to;
-  in 80 per cent of interventions where violence had occurred, no 
repeated violence has been reported;
-  in 94 per cent of interventions, the conflict appears to have been 
resolved or partially resolved (in 6 per cent of cases the interven-
tions appear to have failed).
Communities in which the Peace Committees are based have mostly 
been able to resist fighting. The Peace Committees have intervened 
in over 65 conflicts in three years at the cost of $170,000 per year to 
run the project. Clearly, the benefits outweigh the costs.
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2. Colombia: Local Peace Communities26 
There have been hundreds of LPCs in Colombia, mostly between 1998 
and 2002 (see chapter 4). Objectives were to get protection from the 
surrounding violence, but also to establish participatory democracy 
and encourage local development. Often CSO leaders started such 
a process, but also mayors or local administration took the initiative.
Many LPCs started at the end of the 1990s, when peace negotiations 
started under president Pastrana. The Bogota-based peace organisation 
REDEPAZ – a network of mostly local and regional peace initiatives–
began a project in 1998 to help establish and support new and existing 
local peace communities (calling it One Hundred Municipalities for 
Peace). Four years later the project came to an end and was replaced by 
one that sought to develop local democracy. Under Pastrana’s successor 
president Uribe, government policy changed to a military solution of 
the ‘terrorist problem’ and peace communities became targets for the 
security forces.
The success of LPCs is connected to the degree of involvement by 
all the community's various groups and sectors. Contributing to its 
success is also the relationship LPCs establish with existing local power 
and governance structures (without becoming too dependent). Many 
LPCs managed to establish (temporarily) increased security. They 
empowered their members and local civil society. In the absence of 
strong leadership for peace at the national level, local and regional 
initiatives were temporarily filling a gap, with some limited success. 
3. DRC: Centre Resolution Conflicts (CRC) and LPCs27
Centre Resolution Conflicts (CRC) is a Congolese NGO, working 
in the eastern DRC province of North Kivu. It was founded in 1993.
The UK NGO Peace Direct started a relationship with CRC in 
2004. CRC has developed from an organisation focussed on training 
displaced people to peacefully coexist with members of other tribes 
into an organisation whose mediation skills are called upon by local 
communities, international NGOs, multilaterals and local government 
officials right across North Kivu. CRC is now a member of the 
UNOCHA protection cluster in the region.
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CRC is known for its successful community-led disarmament, de-
mobilisation and reintegration work in DRC. It has persuaded ex-
combatants to leave the bush - and communities to accept them back. 
In addition, CRC has educated and assisted 20,000 people across two 
provinces, by helping 14,400 displaced persons to return safely home, 
rescuing 650 child soldiers and mobilising former enemies to resolve 
conflicts via mediation and negotiation. Much of CRC’s success is ba-
sed on its ability to engage with armed actors (including rebel groups) 
and to negotiate the protection of their communities from violence.
Local Committees for Peace are created by CRC. They are non-
partisan, a-political frameworks for consultation and analysis, reflection 
and action of grassroots communities around issues of reconciliation, 
security and participation in the management of public affairs. Since 
its inception CRC has set up dozens of Local Peace Committees. 
Some 20 Peace Committees have evolved into very active Task Forces. 
4. Uganda: Peace Committees in the Karamoja region28
In Uganda, Peace Committees exist in the Karamoja and Acholi regions 
in the North. Their role is to prevent and resolve conflicts, assess the 
situation in the field and report or respond to an impending outbreak 
of violent conflict. They also follow up and recover stolen/raided 
livestock. One insider reports from interviews with the police and 
community members that cattle raids have reduced, although cattle 
theft still occurs. However, road ambushes were reported ceased and 
a level of peace is returning to Karamoja. 
5.  Kenya: the Wajir Peace and Development Committee29
We will describe the example of the Wajir Peace and Development 
Committee in Kenya in some more detail, because of its relevance. 
During the early 1990s a highly destructive cycle of violent conflict 
raged in the district of Wajir in the Northeast region between different 
clans of Kenyan Somalis, leading to 1,213 deaths over a period of 4 
years. The violent conflict had its roots in the centuries' old custom 
of livestock raiding by pastoralist groups. The situation became more 
violent because of an influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia 
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and Ethiopia, increasing aridity, the ready availability of small arms 
and the very weak presence of government in the district, resulting in 
the failure of state institutions to regulate conflict and provide security 
(Ibrahim and Jenner, 1998).
In 1993 a group of women met at the market place and started a 
discussion on ways to stop the violence. This resulted in a process of 
peacemaking that is impressive by all accounts. The process basically 
entailed the formation of a group of civil society actors working together 
to sensitize the population to the need for peace. They engaged the 
elders of the different clans and set up a mediation process. After 
several meetings, the elders agreed to sign a code of conduct, which 
effectively stopped the violence. In this process civil society actors 
worked with representatives of formal authority, particularly the 
District Commissioner and Member of Parliament, but on a voluntary 
basis.
The initiative was home-grown and locally owned. It was soon realized 
that the LPC would need some form of formalization to provide 
coordination to all peacebuilding activities. It was decided to integrate 
the peace initiatives into one structure that would bring government, 
NGOs and citizen groups together. This was done in May 1995, when 
the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was formed, with the 
District Commissioner as chairperson. Members included the heads 
of all government departments, representatives of the various peace 
groups, religious leaders, NGO representatives, traditional chiefs and 
security officers.
The success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in 
bringing peace to the district soon led to the spread of the model to 
other districts. International donors, NGOs and the National Council 
of Churches became involved in facilitating and supporting the 
establishment of local peace committees. In 2001 the government 
established the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Management with the objective to formulate a national 
policy on conflict management and to provide coordination to various 
peacebuilding initiatives, including the local peace committees. 
Much of the success of the Wajir Peace and Development Commit-
tee was due to its ability to engage both traditional leadership and 
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government and to facilitate greater government responsiveness to 
the needs of the population.
In the aftermath of the post-election violence that wracked Kenya in 
late 2007/early 2008, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 
2008 recommended the establishment of District Peace Committees 
in all districts, with priority given to the Rift Valley where most of 
the violence had taken place. During this outburst of violence the 
Northeastern region was quiet and stable. The infrastructure for peace 
that has been formalized by the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Act therefore acknowledged the impact that local peacebuilding had 
thus far and sought to build on it. 
The example of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee is a 
clear example of how a 
bottom-up approach can work and influence and inspire national 
policies. In Kenya, it took ten years, before the government established 
the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict 
Management. A similar bottom-up process led to the National Peace 
Council Act in 2011 in Ghana.
6.  Some general remarks on LPCs
- The work of LPCs is hardly documented; it is very difficult to 
collect hard data on LPCs.
- Most LPCs were established locally because the local communi-
ty felt threatened, violence increased, justice and development 
failed.
- Most LPCs were established by local communities, but they tend 
to involve representatives of local government.
- LPCs have the potential to influence their local situation, but 
often not the broader environment. When mass violence escala-
tes, as in DRC, Colombia and Afghanistan, LPCs cannot control 
the situation anymore. If the broader environment becomes very 
polarized or violent, they will be gravely affected. If there is no 
legal and policy framework, the work of LPCs cannot be secured.
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Overall, the LPCs’ main impact was that they 
- solved community problems
- increased local security 
- empowered its members
- developed some countervailing power to local government or 
found ways to cooperate.
Peaceful Elections and I4P
Elections can be an entry-point for starting a national debate on the 
need for Infrastructures for Peace.30  "Elections are a major catalyst 
for democratic change but have an intrinsically conflictual nature. 
Elections make deeply rooted social conflicts more visible and thus have 
great potential for triggering violence. If such violence is ignited by the 
electoral process, or perceived to have been, the effects may have grave 
implications for human rights and local economies, and may create an 
inherent distrust in the credibility of democracy."31
Elections are structured processes of competition for control of poli-
tical power. In many countries, a key challenge to the governance and 
political process is that electoral competitions are a zero-sum game: 
the winner takes all. Election to public office offers livelihoods and 
privileges not just for the elected leaders, but also their party sup-
porters, family, clan or ethnic group. Because of the consequences of 
electoral defeat the incentives to resort to electoral fraud and violence 
are high. Elections may also make deeply rooted social conflicts visible 
and provide the opportunity for people to express other grievances.
Following violent elections in Kenya in 2007 and in Cote d'Ivoire in 
2010, the international community, national governments and civil 
society actors are becoming increasingly aware of the need to place 
a greater emphasis on prevention of electoral violence. The support 
has so far mainly focussed on strengthening Electoral Management 
Bodies (EMBs), voter registration and electoral monitoring, but 
this is changing. IDEA has developed a 'three layered approach' for 
prevention and mitigation of election-related violence: Improved 
Electoral Management and Justice, Improved Electoral Security and 
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Improved Infrastructures for Peace.32  This broader approach is much 
needed and promising.
Some points are of great value in preparing for peaceful elections, and 
maybe part of an I4P-policy as well:
- Start early. Analysis, planning and measures for the prevention 
of electoral violence should begin two years or more before 
elections. The political context 12 to 24 months before an 
election is often more amenable to peaceful management than 
the political climate just before elections.
-  Effective, early and joint analysis is critical. Scenario planning 
can help. Many of the factors which may contribute to electoral 
violence in a community/country can be identified months 
or years in advance. Root causes which give rise to grievances 
and triggers which may lead to the outbreak of violence can be 
mapped, identified and addressed/prepared ahead of time.
-  Use a governance and electoral cycle approach. Elections are not 
separate from the broader context of politics and governance. 
In many countries, elections for different offices (president, 
parliament, local government) may also take place at different 
times. Preparations for one election can have benefits for the 
next.
-  Develop national strategies. Such national strategies are helpful 
and should include all relevant ministries and state and non-
state actors with mandates for elections, peacebuilding or 
dealing with possible violence.33 
Many countries have a conflict potential that is not addressed. Elec-
tions trigger often those grievances. Broad and more semi-permanent 
preventing electoral violence programs are needed. This means for the 
electoral assistance community to include such broader programs in 
their planning and to analyse the potential for I4P in the planning in 
their country. The I4Pcommunty should dedicate special attention in 
their work towards the organising of peaceful elections. 
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Does I4P work?
We will describe in more detail in this chapter how Peace Infrastructures 
in practice have worked and prevented or reduced violence. Not all cases 
are thoroughly documented; more research is needed to document and 
assess how and when I4P works.
In Kenya and in Ghana, Regional Peace Committees worked so well 
that national governments spread the model. Here we will describe 
these examples in more detail, because the broad consultation 
processes of main stakeholders are key to the concept of I4P.
Ghana
In Ghana, 23 violent conflicts were recorded in three northern regions 
between 1980 and 2002. Many community-based and inter-ethnic 
conflicts were intractable, because of a failing justice system; many 
court cases were not resolved. When violence first erupted, the 
government approach suppressed violence by using force. It then 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry that allocated blame and often 
ignored the commission’s recommended sanctions. 
This approach led to more conflict. It is estimated that up to 5,000 
people died as a result of the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict in 1994. 
The 1994 conflict involved seven ethnic groups. After this eruption, 
NGOs initiated a different approach by integrating peacebuilding and 
development work. The thinking was that once communities owned 
the process of finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems that 
divided them, development programs could become sustainable. In 
summary, civil society sought to uncover the deeper sources of conflict 
and to focus on dialogue, deeper mutual understanding, joint problem-
solving and reconciliation.
NGOs formed a working group called the Inter-NGO Consortium. 
They organised and facilitated a series of peace and reconciliation 
consultations and workshops among the warring ethnic groups. After 
negotiations, the delegates agreed to a draft document, which was 
taken by the delegates to their respective communities for extensive 
consultations. After four weeks, the delegates returned. Amendments 
were incorporated in the draft agreement and the Kumasi Accord on 
Peace and Reconciliation was signed March 1996.
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When in 2002 another eruption of violence within the Dagombas 
led to the slaying of the King of Dagbon and many of his elders, 
this threatened to destabilise the whole region; it would feature as a 
major campaign issue during the elections. The regional government 
remembered the innovative approach to solving the Konkomba-
Nanumba conflict. In 2004 it established the Northern Region Peace 
Advisory Council as a mediation and conflict resolution mechanism to 
deal with the issues of trust among the factions. With the success of 
the Northern region Peace Advisory Council, the government decided 
to explore the possibility and relevance of extending the peace council 
concept to the rest of the country.34 
The national government sought technical assistance from the United 
Nations to assist it in designing and implementing a range of activities 
to build confidence among the factions, create spaces for dialogue 
between the traditional, business and other elite and build capacity 
within the leadership of the factions on negotiation and consensus 
formation. After a process of consultations, a 'roadmap to peace' was 
signed by the chiefs in Kumasi in March 2006.The outcome of those 
consultations was a 'national architecture for peace'. The key body of 
this infrastructure was the National Peace Council.
In December 2008, chieftancy-related conflicts in parts of the country 
and the discovery of oil led to new tensions as the country approached 
national elections and the prospects for violence increased. When the 
elections were held, the narrowest of margins – 50,000 votes– separated 
the winner from the loser. With tension rising, the National Peace 
Council helped mediate a peaceful political transition. Emmanuel 
Bombande from Ghana, founder of the West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP), concluded: "When it mattered most in 
an extremely difficult moment during Ghana's elections in 2008, the 
National Peace Council was there to save Ghana."35 
Kenya
In Kenya, the success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee 
led to the spread of this concept to other districts in the north-
eastern part of Kenya. In 2001, the National Steering Committee on 
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was established.
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The elections of December 2007 in Kenya were peaceful, but resulted 
in post-election violence that left some 1,300 people dead and 300,000 
displaced. In districts where District Peace Committees had been 
established, less violence took place than in districts without DPCs. 
Because of these successes, the government decided to establish DPCs 
in all 50 districts.
In 2010, a constitutional referendum was held, without any substantial 
violence. Ahead of the referendum, UNDP provided discreet support 
for successful national efforts to reach a political agreement on the 
new draft constitution. It also helped government and civil society 
implement an early warning and response system (the Uwiano 
Platform) that prevented more than one hundred incidents of potential 
violence in the volatile Rift valley alone. Local peace committees were 
strengthened in all of the country's districts and played a critical role 
during the referendum.36
South Africa37
The transition from apartheid South Africa and an emerging 
democracy was served by a well-developed peace architecture; local 
peace committees were the main structure that prevented or reduced 
violence. These committees operated between 1991 and 1994 and 
were terminated following the successful national elections of April 
1994. The pioneering nature of South Africa's peace committees drew 
the attention of other countries as a model that might be copied. Ball 
estimates that " ... the peace committee concept is transferable, but the 
precise form such committees assume should be developed locally".
South African local peace committees were a product of its National 
Peace Accord (NPA), signed in September 1991 between the main 
protagonists in the conflict. Twenty-seven South African parties and 
institutions signed the NPA, including the government, most political 
parties, major liberation movements, business, churches and others. 
The main reason for establishing the NPA was to respond to the 
country's escalating violence that had killed more than 6,000 people 
between 1985 and 1990. The National Peace Accord was not a peace 
agreement in the strict sense of the word; it was essentially a code of 
conduct that bound the signatories to a set of mutually agreed ground 
rules. The peace architecture consisted of:
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-  A National Peace Committee with representatives of all signato-
ries;
-  Regional Peace Committees in all 11 regions of the country;
-  Local Peace Committees in all affected areas;
-  A National Peace Secretariat to establish and coordinate regional 
and local peace committees.
The main tasks of LPCs were to:
-  create trust and reconciliation between community leaders, 
including the police and army;
-  prevent violence and intimidation; 
-  resolve disputes that could lead to public violence.
Several studies (especially Ball and Spies, 1998) have assessed the 
impact of LPCs. Some observations are:
-  the LPCs contributed towards containing the spiral of violence– 
despite the fact that the number of violent deaths increased 
during the lifetime of the LPCs.
-  LPCs facilitated local dialogue and (for the first time) assemblies 
of stakeholders made up of all relevant categories of participants 
were able to address local issues jointly.
Guyana
In 2006, after a period of rising political tension, Guyana conducted its 
first ever violence-free election. An independent external evaluation 
conclusively attributed this result to a UNDP-supported national 
initiative known as the Social Cohesion Programme. A national 
dialogue, a network of local mediators to help ease tensions among 
communities and agreements among political parties were some of 
the instruments used.38
Cost of conflict and of conflict prevention, including I4P
The establishment of I4P in some countries, has cost the UNDP 
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) no more than a 
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few million US dollars. BCPR is now involved in the establishment 
of I4P in countries as Kenya, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Togo, Ivory 
Coast, Uganda and several more.
Building sustainable Peace is crucial. Too often, we support fragmented 
peacebuilding activities that do not add up and are not strengthening 
each other. Too often, we stop the support after some years, while we 
know this needs to be a long time investment. Establishing sustainable 
peace mechanisms, capacities and structures requires an investment 
of at least ten years. But the gains are enormous: stable countries, with 
severely reduced risks of falling back in conflicts.
There is a need of a Programme or Fund for sustainable national 
infrastructures for Peace, set up by governments, foundations, the 
private sector and CSOs. In this phase, it may cost perhaps 20-30 
million dollars a year; within ten years the result may be 10-15 stable 
countries, with a solid peace-agenda and prospects for development. 
Such a Programme or Fund should be gradually expanded, to include 
more countries aiming for I4P. 
In Kenya, the leading business association put economic losses from 
post-election violence in 2008 at US$ 3.6 billion. Two years later, prior 
to the 2010 constitutional referendum, a UNDP-supported violence 
prevention effort identified and pre-empted nearly 150 incidents of 
violence and helped political parties reach consensus on the draft 
constitution before the vote. There was no violence and by contrast 
the exercise cost only US$ 5 million.
According to the Ghana Investment Promotion Council, direct foreign 
investment in the country jumped 90 percent between mid-2008 and 
mid-2009. The intervening variable was the peaceful national poll in 
December 2008. The National Peace Council, with approximately 2 
million dollar financial support from UNDP, played a crucial mediation 
role in averting expected turbulence. Expectations of violence had 
depressed investment prior to the poll.39
Compare these amounts: the annual expense for peacekeeping is 
around US$ 8 billion; the Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict 
peacebuilding cost US$ 350 million. The resources available for 
establishing infrastructures for peace are a pittance, about US$ 3 
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million a year!40  As a result, key initiatives are often not continued 
after the first year or two despite concrete results, and UNDP and 
DPA scrounge for funds to continue the deployment of peace and 
development advisers and similar specialists.
Lessons learnt and some challenges
Let us summarise some important lessons and challenges as regards I4P.
-  Broad diversity of activities/mechanisms and tools: Many 
approaches seem to work. Further research should indicate which 
tools, etc. work best under which conditions.
-  A semi-independent peace structure seems best: an I4P involves 
the government and other stakeholders at all levels. The invol-
vement of all stakeholders is crucial. It is therefore important 
to establish a Peace Infrastructure with the government as one 
of the pillars, without it steering the whole process. Too often, 
government dominates and other stakeholders feel marginalized. 
In polarized situations, governments maybe paralysed, rendering 
an independent peace structure a more preferable option. 
-  Local Peace Committees fulfil important roles: they can fill a void 
in dispute resolution in local governance and are particularly 
effective during transitional periods. LPCs can open a dialogue 
in a divided community, solve community conflicts and protect 
their community from violence.
-  More permanent structures & funding is needed: aiming for sus-
tainable peace and development means establishing permanent 
peace structures. This requires long-term investments such a 
Peace Infrastructure. The normal pattern of funding for two or 
three years is not appropriate.
-  Developing a research agenda: research issues should include the 
mandate and tasks of NPCs, how a Peace Infrastructure relates to 
other state institutions, the composition of Peace Committees, 
impact and evaluation of I4P and many other topics.
-  Peaceful elections: the existence of an I4P substantially increases 
the chances of peaceful elections by having a network and structu-
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re. Related points include: linking the different levels and sectors/
actors, early warning and response system and the capacities for 
conflict prevention and mediation.
- Need for an international civil society network on I4P: with the 
increasing interest in I4P and LPCs and the establishment of I4P 
in more countries, it is evident that we need an international I4P 
civil society network to exchange experiences between different 
stakeholders, reach out to a broader community and do advocacy 
work. Such a network has to be linked to other important stake-
holders as governments and UN/BCPR. 
Concluding remarks
Increasingly, violent conflicts are a reality around elections, during the 
hunt for resources or in collapsing countries. West Africa experienced 
recently conflicts in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Mali. It is 
urgently needed to analyse how we could enhance sustainable peace 
within countries. Establishing Infrastructures for Peace could be an 
important pillar for such a plan.
More focus should be given to long-term investment in capacities, 
mechanisms and structures for sustainable peace. A substantial increase 
in funds for I4P is needed. An International Civil Society Network 
on Infrastructures for Peacerecently has been established, with some 
thirty NGOs, LPCs and networks, mainly from Southern countries. 
The Network’s new website will be launched in January 2013 (www.
infrastructuresforpeaceinternational.org).41
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AbstrAct 
Creating Infrastructures for Peace–  
Experiences at three continents
Peace can be planned. In most cases violent escalation of con-
flicts can be prevented. Countries at risk of instability and civil war 
need mechanisms and structures for cooperation amongst all relevant 
stakeholders in peacebuilding. Institutional structures for peace create 
a forum for all peace actors for dialogue and cooperation. Evidence 
demonstrates that peace structures work. The article elaborates on 
the components of peace infrastructures and describes experiences in 
three continents. To build on the experiences and to explore the fur-
ther potential of these peace structures, an International Civil Society 
Network on Infrastructures for Peace has recently been established.
Resumen 
La creación de infraestructuras para la paz–  
Experiencias en tres continentes
La paz puede ser planeada. En la mayoría de los casos, la escalada violenta 
de los conflictos puede prevenirse. Los países que se encuentran en 
riesgo de inestabilidad y guerra civil necesitan mecanismos y estructuras 
para posibilitar la cooperación de todos los actores involucrados en 
la construcción de la paz.  Las estructuras institucionales para la paz 
generan un espacio de diálogo y cooperación para todos los actores de la 
paz. Ha quedado demostrado que las estructuras para la paz funcionan. 
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Este artículo ahonda en los componentes de las infraestructuras para la 
paz y describe experiencias en tres continentes. Recientemente se ha 
creado una Red Internacional de la Sociedad Civil para el desarrollo de 
Infraestructuras para la Paz para capitalizar esas experiencias y explorar 
el potencial adicional de las estructuras para la paz. 
summArio 
A criação de infra-estruturas para a paz:  
Experiências em três continentes
A paz pode ser planejada. Na maioria dos casos, a escalada violenta dos 
conflitos pode ser prevenida. Os países que se encontram em risco de 
instabilidade e guerra civil necessitam de mecanismos e estruturas para 
possibilitar a cooperação de todos os atores envolvidos na construção da 
paz. As estruturas institucionais para a paz geram um espaço de diálogo 
e cooperação para todos os atores da paz. Ficou demonstrado que as 
estruturas para a paz funcionam. Este artigo aprofunda a abordagem 
dos componentes das infra-estruturas para a paz e descreve experiências 
em três continentes. Criada recentemente, a Rede Internacional da 
Sociedade Civil para o Desenvolvimento de Infra-estruturas para a Paz 
tem como objetivo capitalizar essas experiências e explorar o potencial 
adicional das estruturas para a paz.
